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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
 
In The Supreme Court
 
Russell Earley, Respondent,
v.
State of South Carolina, Petitioner.
Appellate Case No. 2014-001566
Appeal from Sumter County
 
George C. James, Jr., Post-Conviction Relief Judge
 
Opinion No. 27672
 
Submitted February 16, 2016 – Filed October 19, 2016
 
REVERSED
Attorney General Alan Wilson and Assistant Attorney 
General Daniel Gourley, both of Columbia, for 
Petitioner.
Tommy A. Thomas, of Irmo, for Respondent.
JUSTICE KITTREDGE: This is a post-conviction relief (PCR) matter.  
Respondent Russell Earley was convicted of criminal solicitation of a minor and 
sentenced to eight years in prison.  After withdrawing his direct appeal, 
Respondent filed a PCR application.  The PCR court granted Respondent relief.  
We reverse and reinstate Respondent's conviction and sentence.
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I.
 
Respondent's criminal charge arose from an encounter with a fourteen-year-old 
male (Victim) outside a public restroom at Walmart in Sumter in November 2008.  
On the evening of the incident, the Victim visited Walmart with his grandmother,
who had promised to buy him some headphones.  The Victim and his grandmother 
went in separate directions when they entered the store—the Victim headed for the 
electronics department while his grandmother went to pick up a few grocery items. 
After separating from his grandmother, the Victim stopped to use the restroom
before shopping for headphones; as he entered the restroom, he noticed 
Respondent following him.  The Victim stated he felt uncomfortable because 
Respondent stood in the restroom watching the Victim use the urinal.  The Victim 
testified Respondent thereafter followed him out of the restroom, pointed to the 
Victim's genitals, and offered the Victim oral sex, which the Victim declined in no
uncertain terms.  The Victim immediately reported the incident to Walmart 
security, and multiple witnesses testified the Victim was visibly upset after the 
incident.  
As the Victim relayed the incident to store employees, a Walmart security officer 
spotted Respondent heading toward an exit and noticed a "steady pace about
[Respondent's] step."1 Respondent had not purchased anything and was leaving
the store alone.  The security officer immediately called law enforcement, followed 
Respondent out of the store, and watched him get into his vehicle and leave the 
parking lot.  Within minutes, a police officer stopped Respondent's vehicle 
approximately half a mile from Walmart.  Respondent was identified as the 
perpetrator and was arrested. 
There were no witnesss to the incident, and nothing was captured on Walmart 
surveillance video.  In an effort to undermine the Victim's character and thus his 
story at trial, defense counsel sought to introduce a cartoon image obtained from
the Victim's Facebook page referencing marijuana use; however, the trial court 
1 The security officer stated Respondent was not running but explained 
Respondent's step was "not just your general [way of] casually" leaving the store. 
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denied the motion, finding the cartoon from the Victim's Facebook page was not
admissible. The trial court did, however, find that Respondent's 2003 federal 
conviction for bank robbery would be admissible as impeachment evidence.2 
At trial, Respondent testified in his own defense, and defense counsel questioned 
Respondent about his federal bank robbery conviction on direct examination in a 
strategic effort to mitigate its prejudicial impact. According to Respondent, he ate 
dinner with friends on the evening of his encounter with the Victim, and after 
dinner, the group went to Walmart in search of a birthday gift for a friend's son.  
After failing to locate the desired item, Respondent testified the group decided to 
try another store, and he stopped by the restroom before leaving Walmart.  
Respondent admitted encountering the Victim in the restroom; however, 
Respondent denied propositioning the Victim and being attracted to young boys.  
Essentially, the theory of his defense was that the Victim fabricated the whole 
story and the motivation for doing so was that Respondent had caught the Victim 
trying to shoplift CDs.  According to Respondent, he was already in the restroom
using the urinal when the Victim entered the restroom. Respondent testified the 
Victim kept both his hands in the front pocket of his sweatshirt and was acting 
nervous.  Respondent testified he heard "tearing up plastic, like opening CDs," and 
on his way out of the restroom, Respondent passed by the Victim, who was 
standing by the sinks, and said "hey, I wouldn't be doing that, I wouldn't be 
stealing."3 However, Respondent admitted that he never actually saw the Victim
attempting to steal any merchandise; rather, Respondent assumed the Victim was 
stealing CDs because he thought he heard plastic rustling in the Victim's sweatshirt 
pocket.
2 We are aware of this Court's opinion in State v. Broadnax, 414 S.C. 468, 779 
S.E.2d 789 (2015), upon which the dissent relies.  However, the issue of whether 
the trial court conducted a balancing test pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1), SCRE, before 
determining this federal bank robbery conviction was admissible as impeachment
evidence is not an issue before the Court. 
3 Although Respondent admitted being aware that the Walmart security officer 
followed him out the store, he offered no explanation for why he did not report the 
Victim's purported theft at that time.
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The issue in this PCR matter involves a line of questioning during the State's cross-
examination of Respondent.  Specifically, the State had evidence that Respondent
posted the message "See ya" on the Victim's Facebook wall the week before trial,
despite having been ordered after his arrest not to have any contact with the minor
Victim. The State's theory was that by posting such a message, Respondent was 
attempting to intimidate or threaten the Victim on the eve of trial. See State v. 
Edwards, 383 S.C. 66, 72, 678 S.E.2d 405, 408 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding that 
"witness intimidation evidence, if linked to the defendant, may be admitted to
show a consciousness of guilt").  It is undisputed that the State did not provide 
defense counsel with a copy of Respondent's Facebook post "See ya" prior to trial.
Initially, Respondent was unaware the State had a copy of the message he posted 
on the Victim's Facebook page and denied having any contact with the Victim
since the incident in the Walmart bathroom four years earlier. However, once the 
State confronted Respondent with a copy of the message, Respondent admitted
contacting the Victim and explained he did so "[be]cause his time will come."
Defense counsel did not object or otherwise alert the trial court that the State had 
failed to disclose the "See ya" Facebook posting prior to trial. In response to the 
Solicitor's questions about his bank robbery conviction, Respondent volunteered 
that he had been convicted of not one, but nine bank robberies.  Respondent's 
testimony concluded shortly thereafter, and the defense rested without presenting
any other evidence.  
Immediately thereafter, the trial court invited counsel to place upon the record the 
substance of several side-bar conversations that took place off the record during 
the defense presentation.  At that time, defense counsel stated:
[Defense Counsel]:  I understand Your Honor's ruling on the side bar, 
but our position was that while my client testified[,] Mr. 
[Solicitor] had asked him about going on to [the Victim's] 
Facebook page and leaving a message.  And obviously, Judge, 
what we had talked about before was the [marijuana cartoon] that 
we had gotten off of [the Victim's] Facebook page and printed a 
copy.  We talked about that earlier in trial, and it was our intent to
talk about that in response to Mr. [Solicitor's] question about the 
Facebook page. 
15
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
    
     
 
 
  
      
                                       
 
 
The Court: And I ruled that you not—that I was not allowing you to 
put in the information you got off of the [V]ictim's Facebook
about smoking marijuana, whatever.
[Defense Counsel]: And Judge, I wanted to make sure—I was not
going to offer it into evidence, but I wanted to ask my client what 
did he find on the Facebook page.
The Court: Yeah, I would have allowed you to get into anything 
regarding him leaving a message on [the Victim's] Facebook 
page, but not any other information that he might have come 
across on the Facebook so that's why I ruled that you do not
introduce that, okay?
(emphasis added).
The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the trial court sentenced Respondent to eight 
years in prison.  A direct appeal was timely filed but subsequently dismissed upon
Respondent's motion to withdraw his appeal. Thereafter, Respondent filed a PCR 
application, in which his only legal or factual allegation was the general statement
"ineffective assistance of counsel." Respondent's PCR application included no 
further details regarding his legal claims or any facts which supported his asserted 
ground for relief.  Specifically, neither Respondent's PCR application nor his
testimony at the PCR hearing referred, in any way, to his "See ya" Facebook
posting or the word "mistrial."
At the beginning of the PCR hearing, Respondent's PCR attorney summarized for 
the PCR court the ineffective assistance of counsel claims Respondent wished to 
assert; however, this summary likewise made no reference to the Facebook
comment or the word "mistrial."4 Indeed, the Facebook posting was not mentioned
4 This summary of ineffective assistance of counsel claims included counsel's 
failure to adequately prepare for trial; failure to review the State's discovery with 
Respondent; failure to adequately discuss a plea offer with Respondent; failure to 
interview and call as witnesses Respondent's friends who were with him at 
Walmart just before the incident; failure to effectively cross-examine the Victim; 
and failure to adequately advise Respondent regarding his decision whether to 
16
 
  
   
      
 
   
 
 
   
  
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
    
  
 
 
   
 
                                                                                                                             
    
   
until defense counsel brought it up during questioning by the State's attorney about  
his efforts to prepare for trial. In response to a question about why the defense did
not interview or call as witnesses Respondent's friends who were with him at
Walmart around the time of the incident, counsel explained that Respondent's 
friends' testimony would not have been helpful since none of Respondent's friends 
were present at the restroom when the solicitation was alleged to have taken place, 
and in dismissing the impact of his failure to interview and call those witnesses, 
counsel testified that he believed the turning point of the trial was the evidence that
Respondent contacted the victim on Facebook—not the lack of defense witnesses.
After hearing trial counsel's testimony on direct examination that he was surprised 
to learn of the Facebook posting, Respondent's PCR attorney raised, for the first 
time, the issue of Rule 5, SCRCrimP, during cross-examination:
Q. Now, you filed a Rule 5?
A. I did.
Q. Was this contact or this [Facebook] statement, do you think it was 
exculpatory? [Did the State] have an obligation to provide this 
information to you prior to trial?
A. Well, I guess they could have shared it with me.
Q. Could it have been potentially a Rule 5 violation?
A. Come to think of it, it's a statement or alleged statement by my 
client. 
Defense counsel testified that he did not receive a copy of the "See ya" message
Respondent posted on the Victim's Facebook wall in response to the defense's Rule 
5, SCRCrimP request and that Respondent "didn't tell me anything about it." 
Accordingly, defense counsel was "totally unaware" that Respondent had contacted 
the victim via Facebook prior to the trial.  Defense counsel explained:
testify at trial and the ramifications of his prior criminal record. The PCR court 
denied relief on all these grounds.
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We had the case set for trial in front of Judge Young.  And Judge 
Young . . . saw [Respondent] in the courtroom and said, hey, you 
know, I got a conflict.  I can't do this.  And that's what caused it to get 
continued to the next week . . . .  We had done some—one of the 
assistan[ts] in my office had done some [] research. . . . And we 
discovered that this [Victim] had a Facebook page.  And it had on 
there some character.  And it says, "I smoke weed all day."  So we 
thought, hey, you know, maybe this is something we could eventually 
[use to] impeach this [Victim's] character.  So we had it in preparation 
for the trial . . . .
And, of course, when [the trial] got continued, I had told [Respondent]
about that and showed him, look at this thing we found on this 
[Victim]'s Facebook page.  Anyway, I said, well, [Respondent], we'll 
get back together next week.  It looks like . . . they're going to call it 
for trial next week and we'll be prepared for it. . . . 
What did happen and I was totally unaware of this is that 
[Respondent] had had some communication with the [Victim] during 
. . . the week between when it got continued . . .  and I didn't know 
that he had done this.  And, of course, what actually happened is, he 
sent this communication to the [Victim] and evidently the [Victim]
turned around and gave it to [the Solicitor].
Defense counsel testified that he believed, up until that point on cross-examination,
the trial was going well for his client:
I thought on direct, I thought [Respondent] was coming across very
well with the jury.  You know, . . . [he] had this conviction in Federal 
Court . . . but it wasn't . . . something that I thought would hurt him in 
this situation, get it out so the jury would understand.  And the fact 
that he had pled to that showed that he had taken responsibility for 
that.  . . . I didn't think the [Victim] came across as a star witness or 
[was] as sound and [a]s believable as you would like as a prosecutor.
18
 
  
 
 
  
   
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
   
     
   
 
  
   
   
  
Although defense counsel acknowledged that the evidence of Respondent's 
intimidating Facebook post was "going to come out just like [Respondent's] bank
robbery conviction came out" had the State disclosed it before trial, counsel
testified:
Obviously, [my trial strategy] would have changed because then I 
would have known it was coming. . . . if I had known about it, I would 
have brought it out as a part of my direct questioning to [Respondent].  
So that would have taken the sting out of it . . . .
Ultimately, the PCR court granted relief, finding the State should have disclosed 
the "See ya" Facebook posting in response to Respondent's motion pursuant to 
Rule 5(a)(1)(A), SCRCrimP, because the Facebook posting was a "statement" 
made by the defendant, the existence of which was known to the State.  The PCR 
court further found the statement was relevant for both impeachment and witness 
intimidation purposes. Relying on State v. Lawton, 382 S.C. 122, 675 S.E.2d 454 
(Ct. App. 2009), the PCR court concluded the statement was "material to the 
preparation" of the defense, and counsel was therefore deficient for failing to move 
for a mistrial based on the Rule 5 violation. Specifically, the PCR court found 
"there was no practical way for the [Respondent] to avoid testifying, because if he 
did not testify, the only story the jury would have heard was the victim's relatively
uncontracticted testimony"; nevertheless, the PCR court found the Facebook 
posting was material to the preparation of the defense because, had it been
disclosed, "trial counsel would have counseled [Respondent] how to respond to the 
question of whether he'd had any contact with the victim."  As to prejudice, the 
PCR court found a curative instruction would have been insufficient to redress the 
prejudice resulting from the State's failure to disclose the Facebook posting. In
fact, the PCR court essentially ruled that the trial court would have been compelled
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as a matter of law to grant a mistrial.5 This Court issued a writ of certiorari to 
review the PCR court's order.
II.
 
The State argues the PCR court erred in granting relief because the Facebook 
posting was not subject to disclosure under Rule 5, SCRCrimP, and alternatively, 
that the PCR court erred in finding a mistrial would have been required as a matter 
of law given the facts of this case.  Specifically, the State argues that because the 
PCR court found that Respondent would have had to take the stand to rebut the 
State's evidence at trial regardless of his prior knowledge about the State's evidence 
of the comment, disclosure of the comment was immaterial to his defense strategy. 
Even assuming the Facebook posting was subject to disclosure under Rule 5,
SCRCrimP, and that counsel was deficient for failing to move for a mistrial based 
on the State's nondisclosure, we find that the PCR court committed an error of law 
in holding that a mistrial would have been mandated as a matter of law.
5 The dissent contends the PCR judge's findings about prejudice were actually an 
exercise of discretion and points out the words "'as a matter of law' do not, at any 
point, appear in the PCR order."  What the dissent fails to point out or appreciate 
are the actual words that do appear in the PCR order: the PCR court found "the 
analysis of the [prejudice] prong must include an analysis of the question of 
whether the trial judge would have been required to grant a motion for a mistrial," 
and the PCR court ultimately concluded "the trial judge would have been
compelled, upon proper motion, to grant a mistrial"; that "[a] curative instruction 
would not have been sufficient to cure the prejudice"; and that "the applicant has 
established that a mistrial would have to have been granted if trial counsel had
objected to the discovery violation and moved for a mistrial." (emphasis added).  
These findings clearly support our view that the PCR court ruled that the trial court 
would have had only one choice—to grant a mistrial.  Moreover, even Respondent
acknowledges in his brief, "the PCR Court found Respondent was prejudiced 
because had Trial Counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, the Trial Court 
would have been required to grant a mistrial." (emphasis added).  Thus, we reject 
the suggestion that the PCR court viewed its decision on prejudice as involving an 
exercise of discretion.
20
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
    
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
"'A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to 
require reversal of a conviction has two components.'"  Walker v. State, 407 S.C.
400, 404, 756 S.E.2d 144, 146 (2014) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687 (1984)).  "The defendant must first demonstrate that counsel was 
deficient and then must also show the deficiency resulted in prejudice."  Id. at 404– 
05, 756 S.E.2d at 146.  "To satisfy the first prong, a defendant must show counsel's 
performance 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.'" Id. at 405, 756 
S.E.2d at 146 (quoting Franklin v. Catoe, 346 S.C. 563, 570–71, 552 S.E.2d 718, 
722 (2001)).  To prove prejudice resulting from counsel's failure to move for a 
mistrial, an applicant must demonstrate that, had counsel moved for a mistrial, the 
trial court's denial of the motion would have amounted to an abuse of discretion.  
Cf. Morris v. State, 371 S.C. 278, 283, 639 S.E.2d 53, 56 (2006) (finding PCR 
applicant met his burden of proving he suffered prejudice under Strickland as a
result of counsel's failure to request a continuance where the applicant 
demonstrated the trial court's refusal of the continuance would have amounted to
an abuse of discretion); accord Weinn v. State, 281 S.W.3d 633, 641 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2009) ("The failure of appellant's counsel to request a mistrial could only be 
termed an act of ineffective assistance of counsel if a mistrial should have been 
granted."). Where there is no support for the PCR court's conclusion, reversal 
thereof is proper.  See Johnson v. State, 325 S.C. 182, 187–88, 480 S.E.2d 733, 
735–36 (1997) (reversing the grant of PCR where counsel did not object or seek a
mistrial in response to the solicitor's statement during closing that "the defendant 
has not put up a defense, he's not testified" and finding there was no evidence the 
accused was deprived of a fair trial because the trial court instructed the jury that it 
was not to consider the accused's failure to testify in any way and could not use it 
against the accused).
Rule 5, SCRCrimP, requires disclosure of evidence by the State, including 
statements by the defendant:
Upon request by a defendant, the prosecution shall permit the 
defendant to inspect and copy or photograph: any relevant written or 
recorded statements made by the defendant, or copies thereof, within 
the possession, custody or control of the prosecution, the existence of
which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become 
known, to the attorney for the prosecution . . . .
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Rule 5(a)(1)(A), SCRCrimP. "The rule, of course, is intended to enable a 
defendant to obtain prior to trial any of his own statements relevant to the crime 
charged against him so that he will be able to prepare properly to face the evidence 
that may be introduced against him at trial."  United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 
24 (1979) (discussing the underlying purpose of the similar federal rule).
"[W]here a party fails to comply with Rule 5, the court may order the 
noncomplying party to permit inspection, grant a continuance, prohibit 
introduction of the nondisclosed evidence, or enter such order as it deems just 
under the circumstances."  State v. Kerr, 330 S.C. 132, 150, 498 S.E.2d 212, 221
(Ct. App. 1998) (citing Rule 5(d)(2), SCRCrimP; State v. Trotter, 322 S.C. 537, 
542, 473 S.E.2d 452, 4585 (1996)).  "Sanctions for noncompliance with disclosure 
rules are within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed absent an 
abuse of discretion."  Id. (citing State v. Davis, 309 S.C. 56, 63, 419 S.E.2d 820, 
825 (Ct. App. 1992)).  Moreover, the trial court also has the prerogative to waive 
the disclosure requirements "for good cause shown." Rule 5(g), SCRCrimP ("The 
court may, for good cause shown, waive the requirements of this rule.").
When the actions of the Solicitor rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct, the 
question of whether a mistrial is warranted "'is determined by (1) the cumulative 
effect of such misconduct; (2) the strength of the properly admitted evidence of the 
defendant's guilt; and (3) the curative actions taken by the court.'"  State v. Inman, 
395 S.C. 539, 565, 720 S.E.2d 31, 45 (2011) (quoting United States v. Anwar, 428 
F.3d 1102, 1112 (8th Cir. 2005)).  "The power of the court to declare a mistrial 
should be used with the greatest caution and for plain and obvious causes."  State v. 
Johnson, 334 S.C. 78, 89, 512 S.E.2d 795, 801 (1999) (citing State v. Crim, 327 
S.C. 254, 257, 489 S.E.2d 478, 479 (1997)).  "The granting of [a] motion for a 
mistrial is an extreme measure which should be taken only where an incident is so 
grievous that prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way."  State v. 
Patterson, 337 S.C. 215, 227, 522 S.E.2d 845, 851 (Ct. App. 1999).  "Instead, the 
trial judge should exhaust other methods to cure possible prejudice before aborting
a trial."  Id.
In his order granting relief, the PCR court relied heavily upon Lawton, a decision
in which the court of appeals found reversible error in the admission of a letter 
Lawton sent his ex-wife from jail, which stated "I know that my story is full of
lies" and which the State failed to disclose under Rule 5, SCRCrimP, prior to trial.
In Lawton, defense counsel immediately objected to the introduction of and
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questioning about the letter based on the State's failure to disclose it during 
discovery.  The trial court overruled defense counsel's objection, finding that the 
letter was being used only for impeachment purposes, and therefore it was not 
"relevant" within the meaning of Rule 5, SCRCrimP, and did not fall within the 
scope of materials the State was obligated to disclose.  On direct appeal, the court 
of appeals reversed, finding the letter was "relevant" within the meaning of Rule 
5(a)(1)(A), even if the letter impacted only the defendant's credibility, and
therefore, the letter should have been disclosed by the State prior to trial.  The
court of appeals further reasoned that "[d]isclosure of the letter was clearly 
material to the preparation of Lawton's defense because it likely would have 
affected his decision to testify," and because there was "a reasonable probability
[the defendant] would not have testified had he known the State possessed such 
strong impeachment evidence," the court of appeals concluded Lawton was 
prejudiced by the trial court's error in admitting the undisclosed statement. Id. at 
127–28, 675 S.E.2d at 457.
Here, although the PCR court properly found Respondent's undisclosed Facebook 
posting was relevant for the purposes of witness intimidation, the PCR court 
nevertheless erred in concluding the posting had impeachment value prior to trial.  
Unlike the statement in Lawton—"my story is full of lies"—Respondent's 
statement in this case—"See ya"—is not impeaching on its face.  Indeed, there is 
nothing in the message "See ya" that inherently calls into question Respondent's 
credibility.  Rather, the impeachment value of the "See ya" statement in this case
did not arise until Respondent denied contacting the Victim during his trial 
testimony. See Gleason, 616 F.2d at 24 (finding, in bank fraud prosecution, that 
defendant's handwritten notes on agendas and financial statements were not
"relevant" within the meaning of the similar federal criminal discovery rule, and
thus subject to disclosure by the prosecution, because those documents "became
relevant for impeachment purposes only after [the defendant] testified on direct 
that he did not personally keep acquainted with the bank's day-to-day operations").
Nevertheless, even absent any inherent impeachment value, the probative value of
the "See ya" statement as evidence of witness intimidation was apparent to the 
State prior to trial, and therefore, this statement was "relevant" and should have 
been disclosed by the State under Rule 5, SCRCrimP.6 See Edwards, 383 S.C. at
6 We note the precedent that "where evidence is equally available to the accused, 
the obligation on the part of the State to furnish such evidence to the accused is
relieved." Anderson v. Leeke, 271 S.C. 435, 439, 248 S.E.2d 120, 122 (1978); 
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72, 678 S.E.2d at 408 (holding that "witness intimidation evidence, if linked to the 
defendant, may be admitted to show a consciousness of guilt").
That being said, the State's nondisclosure does not, a fortiori, mandate the 
conclusion that trial counsel was deficient in failing to seek a mistrial on that basis.
As to the deficiency prong of the Strickland analysis, a PCR applicant must show 
that trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  
In discussing this issue, the PCR court borrowed the "materiality" analysis from
Lawton and found counsel was deficient in failing to seek a mistrial because 
knowledge that the State possessed the "See ya" Facebook posting was material to 
the preparation of Respondent's defense.  In so finding, the PCR court
acknowledged that "there was no practical way for [Respondent] to avoid
testifying" at trial, yet the PCR court nevertheless concluded the Facebook posting 
was "material to the preparation of [Respondent]'s defense" because if defense 
counsel had been made aware of the posting before trial, "counsel would have 
counseled [Respondent] about not denying its existence."  In other words, although 
the nondisclosure did not, as a practical matter, impact Respondent's decision 
whether to testify, the PCR court found it nevertheless materially undermined 
Respondent's ability to prepare to meet the charges against him because defense 
counsel was denied the opportunity to advise Respondent not to lie about having
made the Facebook posting. This was error.
First, there is no evidence in the record that the nondisclosure of Respondent's "See 
ya" statement had any impact (much less a material impact) upon Respondent's 
trial preparation or his decision to testify; thus, there is no evidence in the record to
support the PCR judge's finding that the nondisclosure was material to the 
preparation of Respondent's defense. Moreover, it was an error of law for the PCR 
court to rely upon the "materiality" or prejudice analysis from Lawton to guide its
analysis of the first prong of the Strickland framework.  Indeed, Lawton dealt only
accord United States v. Meregildo, 920 F.Supp.2d 434, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(explaining that in the context of evidence the government failed to disclose during 
the criminal discovery process, "there is no remedy for a defendant who possesses 
or has access to the information he claims was withheld").  However, because there 
is no evidence in the record as to the relevant social media privacy settings and
whether or to what extent Respondent had access to his Facebook posting after 
making it, we decline the State's invitation to address this issue.
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with the existence and prejudicial impact of a trial court error on direct appeal and
provides no logical basis for evaluating whether counsel's failure to seek a mistrial 
as redress for a Rule 5 violation fell below reasonable professional norms in this 
PCR matter.  Although this Court has held the "presumption of adequate 
representation based on a valid trial strategy disappears when . . . there was no trial 
strategy in mind" in failing to object to improper evidence, Smith v. State, 386 S.C.
562, 568, 689 S.E.2d 629, 633 (2010), the claim at issue here is not that counsel 
rendered deficient performance in failing to object to the State's use of the 
undisclosed Facebook statement.  Rather, the claim at issue is that counsel was 
deficient in failing to move for a mistrial based on the State's use of the "See ya" 
statement that was not disclosed under Rule 5, SCRCrimP.
At the PCR hearing, there was simply no evidence or discussion about the issue of
a mistrial or the factors used to evaluate whether a Solicitor's actions constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct sufficient to justify a mistrial.  Indeed, the word 
"mistrial" does not appear in the PCR transcript, nor is it included in Respondent's 
PCR application or in Respondent's post-hearing memorandum of law. Rather, 
trial counsel's testimony at the PCR hearing reveals that counsel believed that up
until the disputed line of questioning, the trial was progressing favorably for 
Respondent, that defense counsel wished to impeach the Victim's character with
the marijuana cartoon obtained from Facebook, and that Respondent was anxious
to reach a resolution of the charges against him. All of these factors weigh against 
seeking a mistrial and could be construed as valid, strategic reasons why trial 
counsel did not seek such a sanction in response to the State's discovery violation;
nevertheless, we ultimately need not resolve the issue of deficiency because, in any 
event, the PCR court committed an error of law as to the prejudice prong of the 
Strickland analysis.
Even assuming that counsel was deficient for failing to move for a mistrial based 
on the State's nondisclosure, we conclude the PCR court's order was controlled by 
an error of law.  Specifically, we hold the PCR court incorrectly found a mistrial 
was the only remedy available to cure the prejudice resulting from the State's non-
disclosure of the Facebook posting.  In reaching this conclusion, the PCR court
acknowledged the granting of a mistrial is "a serious and extreme measure," one
within the trial court's discretion.  The PCR court nevertheless concluded that "the 
trial judge would have been compelled, upon proper motion, to grant a mistrial."
This was error in two respects.  First, the PCR court ignored the other sanctions
available to the trial court to remedy nondisclosure, and secondly, the PCR court 
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focused myopically on the impeachment value of the Facebook posting and 
ignored its probative value as to witness imtimidation.
Moreover, in evaluating whether a mistrial would have been granted, the PCR 
court narrowly considered the prejudicial impact to Respondent's credibility— 
prejudice which resulted from Respondent's lack of candor on the stand rather than 
from the State's failure to disclose the existence of the witness intimidation
evidence. This was error, for Respondent was under oath when he denied having
contacted the Victim, and the prejudice resulting from his failure to be truthful
cannot be fully attributed to the State or otherwise operate as an automatic benefit 
to Respondent by mandating a mistrial as the only option.7 See State v. Needs, 333
S.C. 134, 152 n.11, 508 S.E.2d 857, 866 n.11 (1998) (finding a party may not
complain about an error induced by the party's own conduct (citing State v. 
Stroman, 281 S.C. 508, 513, 316 S.E.2d 395, 399 (1984); State v. Epes, 209 S.C.
246, 271, 39 S.E.2d 769, 780 (1946))).
We further note that Respondent volunteered on cross-examination that he had 
been convicted of bank robbery nine times, not the single conviction that was 
discussed prior to his testimony.  Surely, when evaluating the entirety of the 
evidence and the alleged prejudice to Respondent from his denial of his Facebook 
"See ya" comment, it is essential to consider all of the impeachment evidence.  The 
error of the PCR court is illustrated by the PCR court's paradoxical finding that
7 The dissent suggests "an equally plausible reading is that Respondent did not 
intentionally lie, or withhold truth on the witness stand, but rather, merely provided
an inartful response to an imprecise question."  There was, of course, nothing 
imprecise about the question or the answer, and trial counsel so conceded.  Trial 
counsel, according to the PCR order, acknowledged Respondent "was caught in a 
blatant lie."  Moreover, we note the logical inconsistency in the positions taken by 
the dissent as to Respondent's denial about having contacted the Victim;
specifically, the dissent urges that this denial undermined Respondent's credibility 
to a degree great enough to warrant a mistrial, yet, that it also was "an inartful 
response to an imprecise question."  To the extent Respondent's denial was merely 
"an inartful response," then it logically follows that it could not have undermined 
Respondent's credibility to a degree sufficient to justify the mistrial the dissent 
claims was necessary.
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Respondent's "credibility was arguably substantially undermined when he 
volunteered on cross-examination that he had been convicted of nine bank
robberies instead of just one."
Turning to the issue of whether a mistrial would have been required to redress the 
Rule 5 violation, we find the prejudice attributable to the State's nondisclosure to
be incremental under the facts of this case and would not have compelled the trial 
court to declare a mistrial.  Had counsel brought the nondisclosure to the trial 
court's attention, it would have been within the trial court's discretion to determine 
the appropriate redress, if any. Moreover, there is no evidence the State withheld
Respondent's Facebook posting in bad faith or that the nondisclosure could not 
have been cured by other, less drastic means, such as a brief recess or a curative 
instruction.  Accordingly, it was error for the PCR court to conclude a mistrial 
would have been manifestly necessary had trial counsel so moved.  See State v. 
Williams, 386 S.C. 503, 510, 690 S.E.2d 62, 65 (2010) (finding the trial court
committed no error in capital murder proceeding in not declaring a mistrial and
giving an Allen charge after jury revealed it was divided nine to three in favor of
death sentence); Green v. State, 351 S.C. 184, 193, 569 S.E.2d 318, 323 (2002) 
(finding counsel was not deficient in deciding not to request a mistrial after the 
jury inquired about the accused's failure to testify based on counsel's belief that the 
jury selected was favorable to the accused and finding there was no evidence of 
prejudice where nothing was presented to demonstrate the accused would be in a
significantly better position upon retrial); State v. Beckham, 334 S.C. 302, 309–10, 
513 S.E.2d 606, 609–10 (1999) (finding defendant, who was accused of murdering 
his wife, was not entitled to a mistrial where a witness referred to wife's visit to a 
battered women's center); State v. Anderson, 322 S.C. 89, 90–94, 470 S.E.2d 103, 
104–06 (1996) (finding no error in failing to declare a mistrial where, in murder 
prosecution, the State's witness identified defendant in court and addressed him,
"Why, [defendant]? Why did you do it?. . . He didn't have to take her life."); State 
v. Craig, 267 S.C. 262, 265–66, 227 S.E.2d 306, 308 (1976) (finding no abuse of 
discretion in trial court's refusal to declare a mistrial where the solicitor stated in
front of the jury, "I'm not up here to give this defendant a Baby Ruth, I'm up here 
to put him in the electric chair"); see also United States v. Martinez, 455 F.3d 
1127, 1130–31 (10th Cir. 2006) (affirming a federal trial court's refusal to declare a 
mistrial based on the government's violation of the similar federal rule, explaining 
that a court should "impose the least severe sanction that will accomplish prompt
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and full compliance" with discovery rules and observing that a cautionary
instruction, a continuance, or exclusion of the evidence are "preferred remedies" 
over "the drastic remedy of mistrial" (quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Because the trial court would not have been compelled to declare a mistrial, we
find the PCR court committed an error of law in finding the outcome of
Respondent's trial would have been different had trial counsel moved for a mistrial 
based on the State's failure to disclose the Facebook posting.  Absent a showing of 
prejudice as required by Strickland, it was error to grant relief.
III.
We reverse the PCR court's order granting relief and reinstate Respondent's 
conviction and sentence.
REVERSED.
BEATTY and HEARN, JJ., concur.  PLEICONES, C.J., dissenting in a 
separate opinion. FEW, J., not participating.
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CHIEF JUSTICE PLEICONES: I respectfully dissent. Like the majority, I 
assume the State violated Rule 5, SCRCrimP, when it impeached Respondent with 
evidence it failed to disclose prior to trial.  However, unlike the majority, I believe 
the PCR judge applied the correct standard of law in assessing whether the State's
Rule 5 violation warranted a mistrial.  Further, because I believe there is probative 
evidence in the record to support the PCR judge's findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, I would affirm the order granting Respondent relief.  See McCray v. State, 
317 S.C. 557, 559, 455 S.E.2d 686, 687 (1995) ("When there is evidence to 
support the findings and conclusions of the PCR judge, this Court will affirm those 
findings and conclusions.").
The majority states the PCR judge erred when he found a mistrial was the only 
remedy available to cure the prejudice resulting from the State's non-disclosure of 
the Facebook posting as a matter of law.8 I read the order differently.  Throughout
his order, the PCR judge correctly articulated that the decision to grant or deny a 
motion for mistrial is within the trial judge's discretion and that a mistrial should 
only be granted "when the prejudice can be removed in no other way."  This is a 
correct statement of law. See State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 216, 692 S.E.2d 490, 
498 (2009) ("[W]hether to grant or deny a mistrial is within the discretion of the 
trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. The 
grant of a motion for a mistrial is an extreme measure which should be taken only 
where an incident is so grievous that the prejudicial effect can be removed in no 
other way.") (citations omitted).
After correctly stating the legal standard for a mistrial, the PCR judge evaluated 
the facts specific to this case, including: the timing of the State's introduction of the 
undisclosed evidence; the strength of the State's overall case against Respondent; 
and the importance of Respondent's trial testimony to his defense.  Based on these 
facts, the PCR judge concluded that: if trial counsel had moved for a mistrial when 
the State impeached Respondent with undisclosed evidence, the trial judge would
have found the prejudice resulting from the State's misconduct could not have been
removed by a curative instruction and the trial judge would have granted the 
motion.  This conclusion by the PCR judge is not a decision controlled by a 
misapprehension of the standard applied by a trial judge in considering a motion 
8 The majority states the PCR judge ruled the trial court would have been
compelled as a matter of law to grant a mistrial; however, the words "as a matter of 
law" do not, at any point, appear in the PCR order.
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for a mistrial.  Rather, it is nuanced application of the law expected of a PCR judge 
vested with authority to assess the merits of PCR claims pursuant the Strickland 
standard. 9 
Further, I disagree with the majority's application of the two prongs of a Stickland
analysis to the facts of this case.  I disagree with the majority's assertion that the 
"quantum of prejudice the PCR judge should have considered was the extent to 
which Respondent was deprived of the opportunity to reduce the prejudice of the 
Facebook comment by strategically addressing it on direct examination."  
Assessing this "quantum of prejudice" is only pertinent in determining whether the 
State violated Rule 5, which, in turn, is relevant to the determination of whether 
trial counsel was deficient.  The majority assumes, and I agree, that when the State 
introduced the Facebook posting at trial without having disclosed it prior to trial, 
trial counsel should have recognized the State's Rule 5 violation and acted 
accordingly.  The PCR judge found that trial counsel was deficient for failing to do 
so, and, in my opinion, there is evidence in the record to support this finding.  See 
McCray, supra. 
As for the Strickland prejudice prong, it is the effect trial counsel's failure to move 
for a mistrial had on Respondent's trial at the time the State's Rule 5 violation 
became apparent, after which the PCR judge was required to determine whether 
Respondent had been prejudiced.  And not, as the majority concludes, how trial 
counsel would have addressed the Facebook posting on direct examination had the 
State properly disclosed the evidence prior to trial.  
In determining whether there was a reasonable probability trial counsel's 
deficiency affected the outcome of Respondent's case, I differ with the majority's 
interpretation of the record.  The majority concludes Respondent committed 
perjury on the witness stand.  After reading the colloquy, which the majority 
describes as demonstrating "lack of candor on the stand," I am convinced an 
9 Indeed, as the majority states, "Had counsel objected, it would have been within
the trial court's discretion to determine the appropriate redress, if any."  That is 
correct.  However, in a PCR action, it is the PCR judge who must determine how 
the trial judge would have exercised his or her discretion had counsel objected at 
trial. See e.g. Morris v. State, 371 S.C. 278, 283, 639 S.E.2d 53, 56 (2006) (where 
this Court found Morris was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance in 
failing to move for a continuance because "the refusal of the continuance would
have amounted to an abuse of discretion").
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equally plausible reading is that Respondent did not intentionally lie, or withhold 
truth on the witness stand, but rather, merely provided an inartful response to an 
imprecise question.  The fact that the State chose to characterize this response as a 
lie throughout the remainder of Respondent's testimony and in closing argument 
does not make it so.  Moreover, in my opinion, it is not for this Court to determine
on appellate review that Respondent committed perjury.  It is the fact-finder's role, 
and solely the fact-finder, to determine the truth or falsity of a witness' testimony.
See State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 358, 737 S.E.2d 490, 500 (2013) (stating "the 
assessment of witness credibility is within the exclusive province of the jury. . . ") 
(citations and alterations omitted).
Accordingly, I do not believe the PCR judge committed an error of law in 
considering the effect the State's impeachment evidence had on the jury's 
perception of Respondent's credibility.  This is exactly the quantum of prejudice
that should be considered in assessing whether there was a reasonable probability
that trial counsel's deficient performance affected the outcome of Respondent's 
trial.  Moreover, this case amounted to a pure swearing contest.  The jury was
asked to determine which story was true: the victim's, that Respondent 
propositioned him, or Respondent's, that he did not proposition the victim, but 
rather, confronted the victim about his shoplifting.  There were no other witnesses 
to the interaction between the victim and Respondent by the Wal-Mart restroom.  
Accordingly, I would affirm the PCR judge's finding that Respondent's credibility 
was essential to his defense and the paramount issue for the jury to determine.
Further, I believe there is evidence in the record to support the PCR judge's finding
that, absent the Rule 5 violation, the credibility of Respondent's testimony would
not have been called into question in such a devastating way.10 Thus, pursuant to
10 I note the majority references Respondent's nine bank robberies as a reason why 
the introduction of the Facebook posting caused only "incremental" prejudice to 
Respondent.  However, we recently held that robbery is not a crime in the nature of
crimen falsi, which "bear[s] upon a witness's propensity to testify truthfully."  See 
State v. Broadnax, 414 S.C. 468, 476, 779 S.E.2d 789, 793 (2015).  Accordingly, it 
is questionable whether Respondent's admission to committing nine bank robberies 
should even bear upon the analysis of whether Respondent's credibility was 
damaged by trial counsel's failure to move for a mistrial.  
Further, even if it were proper to consider the effect of Respondent's bank 
robberies in analyzing how Respondent's credibility was affected by the 
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our scope of review, I would uphold the PCR judge's finding of Strickland
prejudice. See McCray, supra.
Finally, I am also troubled by the policy implication of the majority's opinion.  The 
majority's proposed Strickland analysis essentially creates a new rule of law: as 
long as the State uses incriminating evidence it has withheld in violation of Rule 5 
to successfully convince a jury the defendant's testimony is not credible, the 
defendant cannot argue he or she was prejudiced.  By deflecting blame to the 
defendant for the State's Rule violation, the majority's opinion undermines both the 
goal of Rule 5 and the role of the State in criminal prosecutions.  As the Court of
Appeals explains, the purpose of Rule 5 is to ensure the criminal defendant's right 
to a fair trial:
[Rule 5] is [not] designed to displace the adversary 
system as the primary means by which truth is 
uncovered, but rather to ensure that a miscarriage of 
justice does not occur.  Furthermore, the prosecutor's role 
transcends that of an adversary because he is the 
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
introduction of the Facebook posting, I would still affirm the PCR judge's finding 
that Respondent was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance.  See 
McCray, supra. During Respondent's testimony, Respondent informed the jury 
that he pleaded guilty to the bank robberies because he committed them, while, in
contrast, Respondent did not plead guilty to the charge for which he was on trial 
because he did not commit the crime.  Thus, the effect of the bank robbery 
convictions on the veracity of Respondent's testimony was negligible.  Further, in 
my opinion, the State's introduction of the undisclosed Facebook posting in a way 
that confused Respondent and created the opportunity for the State to characterize 
Respondent as an adult who lies about his social-media contact with a minor victim 
was manifestly more damaging to Respondent's credibility during a trial for
criminal solicitation of a minor than Respondent's past bank robberies.  
Accordingly, there is evidence in the record to support the finding that, if trial 
counsel had moved for a mistrial when the State's Rule 5 violation became 
apparent, there is a reasonable probability the trial judge would have granted the 
motion.  See Strickland, supra.
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but of a sovereignty whose interest in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice 
shall be done.
State v. Kennerly, 331 S.C. 442, 454, 503 S.E.2d 214, 220 (Ct. App. 1998)
(internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
There is probative evidence in the record to support the PCR judge's conclusion a 
reasonable probability exists that a mistrial would have been granted had trial 
counsel moved for one. Therefore, the PCR judge's determination that Respondent 
is entitled to relief must be upheld on review. See McCray, supra. To do anything 
else disregards the great deference afforded to PCR judges' findings of facts and
conclusions of law and condones the State's action of withholding incriminating, 
discoverable evidence from the defense until the moment when introducing that 
evidence will have its most devastating effect.
Accordingly, I would affirm the PCR judge's order granting Respondent relief.
33
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

	




The Supreme Court of South Carolina
In the Matter of James Darrell Dotson, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2016-002097;
Appellate Case No. 2016-002101 
ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel petitions this Court to place respondent on 
interim suspension pursuant to Rule 17 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). The petition also seeks appointment of the Receiver, Peyre T. 
Lumpkin, Esquire, pursuant to Rule 31, RLDE.   
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
until further order of this Court. 
Respondent is hereby enjoined from taking any action regarding any trust, escrow, 
operating, and any other law office account(s) respondent may maintain at any 
bank or other financial institution including, but not limited to, making any 
withdrawal or transfer, or writing any check or other instrument on the account(s).   
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Peyre T. Lumpkin, Esquire, is hereby appointed 
to assume responsibility for respondent's client files, trust account(s), escrow 
account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office accounts respondent 
may maintain. Mr. Lumpkin shall take action as required by Rule 31, RLDE, to 
protect the interests of respondent's clients.  Mr. Lumpkin may make 
disbursements from respondent's trust account(s), escrow account(s), operating 
account(s), and any other law office accounts respondent may maintain that are 
necessary to effectuate this appointment.  Respondent shall promptly respond to
Mr. Lumpkin's requests for information and/or documentation and shall fully 
cooperate with Mr. Lumpkin in all other respects.   
34 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 


Further, this Order, when served on any bank or other financial institution 
maintaining trust, escrow and/or operating account(s) of respondent, shall serve as 
an injunction to prevent respondent from making withdrawals from the account(s) 
and shall further serve as notice to the bank or other financial institution that Peyre 
T. Lumpkin, Esquire, has been duly appointed by this Court. 
This Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, shall 
serve as notice that Peyre T. Lumpkin, Esquire, has been duly appointed by this 
Court and has the authority to receive respondent's mail and the authority to direct 
that respondent's mail be delivered to Mr. Lumpkin's office. 
Mr. Lumpkin's appointment shall be for a period of no longer than nine months 
unless an extension of the period of appointment is requested. 
Finally, within fifteen (15) days of the date of this order, respondent shall serve 
and file the affidavit required by Rule 30, RLDE.  Should respondent fail to timely 
file the required affidavit, respondent may be held in civil and/or criminal 
contempt of this Court as provided by Rule 30, RLDE.    
s/ Costa M. Pleicones C.J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
October 13, 2016 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
In The Court of Appeals 
South Carolina Department of Social Services, 
Respondent, 
v. 
Ngoc Tran and Thomas Nguyen, Defendants, 
Of Whom Ngoc Tran is the Appellant. 
In the interest of a minor child under the age of eighteen. 
Appellate Case No. 2014-001134 
Appeal From Anderson County 
Edgar H. Long, Jr., Family Court Judge 
Opinion No. 5445 
Heard September 8, 2016 – Filed October 10, 2016 
VACATED AND REMANDED 
Kimberly Yancey Brooks, of Kimberly Y. Brooks, 
Attorney at Law, of Greenville, for Appellant. 
Kathleen J. Hodges, of South Carolina Department of 
Social Services, of Anderson, for Respondent.  
Brittany Dreher Senerius, of Senerius & Tye, Attorneys 
at Law, of Anderson, for the Guardian ad Litem.   
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PER CURIAM:  Ngoc Tran (Mother), a Georgia resident, appeals the family 
court's order terminating her parental rights to her minor daughter (Child).  On 
appeal, Mother argues the family court (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 
the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and (2) 
erred in finding clear and convincing evidence supported two statutory grounds for 
termination of parental rights (TPR).  Because we find the Department of Social 
Services (DSS) failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction, we vacate the
underlying removal order and TPR order and remand for additional findings.   
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case began as a removal action on May 21, 2012, when Mother—who was 
traveling through South Carolina—was admitted to the hospital due to an "altered 
mental status."  DSS received allegations that Mother "was found sitting in the 
middle of the road and was not very responsive," Child was with her, and Mother 
could not identify a family member to pick up Child.  Mother was still hospitalized 
when the family court held a probable cause hearing on May 24, 2012; the family 
court determined probable cause existed to remove Child and granted DSS custody 
of Child "[p]ending further orders." 
According to a placement plan prepared by DSS, Mother previously had an 
"altered mental episode" in Georgia and left Child unattended; Mother had an 
"extensive history" with the Department of Families and Children in Georgia; 
Child had been placed in foster care in Georgia; and there were "allegations of 
criminal domestic violence in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania with [Mother's] husband."  
In a December 3, 2012 merits removal order, the family court found Mother placed 
Child at a substantial risk of harm of physical neglect and returning Child to 
Mother's home would place Child at an unreasonable risk of harm.  The family 
court granted DSS custody of Child and ordered Mother to complete a placement 
plan. 
On March 6, 2014, the family court held a TPR hearing.  Mother was not present, 
and the family court denied her request for a continuance.  At the hearing, a DSS 
foster care worker testified Mother was a resident of Cobb County, Georgia; 
Father's last-known address was in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Child was born 
in Pennsylvania. Following testimony, the family court found clear and 
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convincing evidence showed Mother failed to remedy the conditions causing 
removal, Child had been in foster care for fifteen of the most previous twenty-two 
months, and TPR was in Child's best interest.  
Mother filed a motion for reconsideration alleging she was a survivor of domestic 
abuse and had a pending case in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania.  The family 
court held a hearing on Mother's motion.  During the hearing, Mother asserted 
"there was a case in Philadelphia in 2005 that she believed Child was going to be 
required to go back to." The family court asked DSS whether it had investigated 
the allegations of domestic violence in Pennsylvania.  Counsel for DSS replied,  
[B]ased on 2005 we did not do an independent 
investigation early on in the case in terms of the 
Philadelphia situation. I can tell the [c]ourt that we have 
subsequently checked with Philadelphia to find out what 
the status of that case was.  They can find nothing on 
their records. They're going back and checking.  It's, I 
guess, nine years since that case would have happened. 
So at this point we don't have any, either verification or 
proof, you know, or disposition of that case. 
Counsel for DSS stated records from Georgia's Department of Families and 
Children noted allegations of domestic abuse, but she believed that "referred back 
to the Philadelphia records."  The family court acknowledged Mother sent letters to 
the court indicating she had a case in Philadelphia "scheduled for a hearing in July 
of this year"; it asked Mother's counsel whether she had anything to support that.  
Mother's counsel replied, "I don't, Your Honor.  I mean, I was in this case to 
represent her in this case. I don't really know anything about the Philadelphia case 
nor did I investigate it." The family court then asked Mother whether she had any 
documents to support her allegation that she had an upcoming hearing scheduled in 
Pennsylvania; Mother submitted a document to the court.  After reviewing the 
document, the family court replied, "Do you have something else?  This looks like 
something she instituted through the Pennsylvania court system.  I'm not sure.  Do 
you have any further information?"  Mother's counsel stated she did not.  
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Mother asserted she moved from Philadelphia to Georgia to escape domestic 
violence. She stated she had lived in Georgia for three years, and she and Child 
had not had any contact with Father since leaving Pennsylvania ten years prior.  
The record on appeal contains two documents from a Pennsylvania court.  The first 
document is a June 16, 2005 order from the Philadelphia County Family Court 
Division suspending Father's visitation with Child and scheduling a "protection 
from abuse hearing."  The second document is a January 17, 2014 order from the 
Philadelphia County Family Court Division setting a custody hearing for July 16, 
2014; Mother was the petitioner and Father was the Respondent.1 
In its order denying Mother's motion for reconsideration, the family court found,  
[Mother] claims that a court case is pending in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania that involves the issue of 
custody of the child. It appears from the evidence 
presented that [Mother] instituted an action seeking an 
Order of Custody against the child's father, who may be 
[Mother's] current or ex-husband.  The pending court 
case in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania is not relevant to the 
issue of [TPR] in the instant case.  Furthermore[,] it 
appears that the Pennsylvania Courts do not have 
jurisdiction over the matter of custody of this minor 
child. A merits hearing was held on the removal on 
October 25, 2012[,] pursuant to [section] 63-7-1660 [of 
the South Carolina Code].  [M]other was properly served 
but did not appear.  An Order for Removal arising from
the merits hearing was filed on December 3, 2012.  This 
was a final order, Hooper v. Rockwell, 334 S.C. 281, 513 
S.E.2d 358 (1999), holding merits orders are final orders 
which must be timely appealed.  [Mother] did not appeal 
the Removal order and therefore jurisdiction regarding 
the custody of [Child] vested in the State of South 
Carolina in 2012[,] and the Pennsylvania Courts are 
1 This appears to be the document the family court reviewed at the reconsideration 
hearing. 
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without jurisdiction to act regarding the custody of the 
minor child.   
This appeal followed. 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
Mother argues the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the 
UCCJEA. She contends South Carolina was not Child's home state when this 
removal action began, and South Carolina only had emergency jurisdiction under 
section 63-15-336 of the South Carolina Code (2010).  We agree.
In appeals from the family court, this court reviews factual and legal issues de 
novo. Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011).   
"Subject matter jurisdiction is 'the power to hear and determine cases of the general 
class to which the proceedings in question belong.'" Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc., 314 
S.C. 235, 237-38, 442 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1994) (quoting Bank of Babylon v. Quirk, 
192 Conn. 447, 472 A.2d 21, 22 (1984)).  A court without subject matter 
jurisdiction does not have authority to act.  Id. at 238, 442 S.E.2d at 600. "A 
judgment of a court without subject-matter jurisdiction is void."  Coon v. Coon, 
364 S.C. 563, 566, 614 S.E.2d 616, 617 (2005). 
"Lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, can be raised for the 
first time on appeal, and can be raised sua sponte by the court."  Badeaux v. Davis, 
337 S.C. 195, 205, 522 S.E.2d 835, 840 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Lake v. Reeder 
Constr. Co., 330 S.C. 242, 248, 498 S.E.2d 650, 653 (Ct. App. 1998)).  "Lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, even by consent of the parties, and 
should be taken notice of by this [c]ourt."  Id.  "[I]t is the duty of this court to take 
notice and determine if the [f]amily [c]ourt had proper jurisdiction for its actions."  
Id. 
"The [Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)2] and the UCCJEA govern 
subject matter jurisdiction in interstate custody disputes."  Anthony H. v. Matthew 
G., 397 S.C. 447, 451, 725 S.E.2d 132, 134 (Ct. App. 2012).  "The PKPA is 
2 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738(A) (2006).
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primarily concerned with when full faith and credit should be given to another 
[s]tate's custody determination."  Id. (alteration by court) (quoting Doe v. Baby 
Girl, 376 S.C. 267, 278, 657 S.E.2d 455, 461 (2008)).  "The UCCJEA's primary 
purpose is to provide uniformity of the law with respect to child custody decrees 
between courts in different states."  Id. "[B]oth the PKPA and UCCJEA apply to 
TPR actions."  Id. 
The UCCJEA, which has been adopted by South Carolina,3 Georgia,4 and
Pennsylvania,5 provides three basic ways a state can establish jurisdiction over a 
case involving child: a state can have jurisdiction to make an initial child custody 
determination, a state can have jurisdiction to modify a child custody 
determination made by another state, or a state can have temporary emergency 
jurisdiction. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-330 (2010) (initial determination 
jurisdiction); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-334 (2010) (modification jurisdiction); S.C. 
Code Ann. § 63-15-336 (2010) (temporary emergency jurisdiction).  After a state 
issues an initial child custody determination, it retains exclusive continuing 
jurisdiction over that child until either (1) a court of the issuing state determines 
the child and the child's parents no longer have a significant connection with the 
state and substantial evidence is no longer available in the state or (2) the issuing 
state or the other state determines the child and the child's parents no longer reside 
in the state. S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-332 (2010).  South Carolina courts defer "to 
the jurisdiction of the state that initially rules on a custody matter."  Russell v. Cox, 
383 S.C. 215, 219, 678 S.E.2d 460, 462-63 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Widdicombe 
v. Tucker-Cales, 366 S.C. 75, 87, 620 S.E.2d 333, 339-40 (Ct. App. 2005), vacated 
in part on other grounds, 375 S.C. 427, 653 S.E.2d 276 (2007)). 
[A] South Carolina family court, except [as provided by 
section 63-15-336], may not modify a custody order 
issued by a court of another state unless a court of this 
State has jurisdiction to make an initial custody 
determination under the [UCCJEA] and (1) the court of 
the issuing state determines either that it no longer has 
continuing jurisdiction or that a court of this State would 
be a more convenient forum; or (2) either a South 
3 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 63-15-300 to -394 (2010).
4 Ga. Code Ann. §§ 19-9-40 to -104 (2015 & Supp. 2016).
5 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 5401–5482. 
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Carolina court or a court of the issuing state determines 
that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting 
as a parent do not presently reside in the issuing state. 
 
Id. at 217-18, 678 S.E.2d at 462 (emphasis added by court) (citing § 63-15-334).   
 
Section 63-15-336 sets forth when South Carolina may exercise temporary 
emergency jurisdiction: 
 
(A) A court of this [s]tate has temporary emergency 
jurisdiction if the child is present in this [s]tate and the 
child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an 
emergency to protect the child because the child . . . is 
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.  
 
(B) If there is no previous child custody determination 
that is entitled to be enforced under this article and a 
child custody proceeding has not been commenced in a 
court of a state having jurisdiction under [s]ections 63-
15-330 through 63-15-334, a child custody determination 
made under this section remains in effect until an order is 
obtained from a court of a state having jurisdiction under 
[s]ections 63-15-330 through 63-15-334.  If a child 
custody proceeding has not been or is not commenced in 
a court of a state having jurisdiction under [s]ections 63-
15-330 through 63-15-334, a child custody determination 
made under this section becomes a final determination, if 
it so provides and this [s]tate becomes the home state of 
the child. 
 
(C) If there is a previous child custody determination that 
is entitled to be enforced under this article, or a child 
custody proceeding has been commenced in a court of a 
state having jurisdiction under [s]ections 63-15-330 
through 63-15-334, any order issued by a court of this 
[s]tate under this section must specify in the order a 
period that the court considers adequate to allow the 
person seeking an order to obtain an order from the state 
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having jurisdiction under [s]ections 63-15-330 through 
63-15-334. The order issued in this [s]tate remains in 
effect until an order is obtained from the other state 
within the period specified or the period expires.   
(D) A court of this [s]tate which has been asked to make 
a child custody determination under this section, upon 
being informed that a child custody proceeding has been 
commenced in, or a child custody determination has been 
made by, a court of a state having jurisdiction under 
[s]ections 63-15-330 through 63-15-334, shall 
immediately communicate with the other court.  
At the time of the removal, Mother and Child were traveling through South 
Carolina, and neither Mother, Father, nor Child had ever lived in this state.  The
evidence shows Georgia—not South Carolina—was Child's home state, and the 
record contains no evidence showing Georgia declined jurisdiction.  Thus, South 
Carolina did not have jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination 
pursuant to section 63-3-330 or modify a child custody decree from another state 
pursuant to section 63-3-334. South Carolina's only basis for jurisdiction was 
section 63-15-336, which allows a state to exercise temporary emergency 
jurisdiction. The South Carolina family court had a valid basis to exercise 
emergency jurisdiction at the time of the probable cause hearing; however, whether 
the subsequent removal order became a final order under the UCCJEA hinges upon 
whether another state issued a prior child custody determination entitled to be 
enforced under the UCCJEA. See § 63-15-336(B) (providing an order issued by a 
state exercising emergency jurisdiction can become a final order if (1) "there is no 
previous child custody determination that is entitled to be enforced under" the 
UCCJEA, (2) "a child custody proceeding has not been or is not commenced in a 
court of a state having jurisdiction under [s]ections 63-15-330 through 63-15-334," 
(3) the order "so provides," and (4) this state becomes the child's home state).   
In the record on appeal, Mother submitted a 2005 order from the Pennsylvania 
court that could constitute a child custody determination under the UCCJEA 
because it concerned visitation of Child. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-302(3) 
(2010) ("'Child custody determination' means a judgment, decree, or other order of 
a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect 
to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification 
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order."). Additionally, during oral argument, counsel for Mother indicated Cobb 
County, Georgia, had also issued an order affecting Child.  Because Mother has 
submitted evidence of an existing out-of-state order, DSS has the burden of 
proving South Carolina has jurisdiction to proceed with this action.  See Anthony 
H., 397 S.C. at 452, 725 S.E.2d at 135 ("[F]or South Carolina cases involving 
jurisdictional questions under the UCCJEA, if the defendant provides evidence to 
the court of an existing out-of-state order, the plaintiff assumes the burden of 
proving the new state has jurisdiction to issue the initial child custody order and 
the issuing state has lost or declined to exercise its jurisdiction.").  DSS has not met 
that burden; thus, we cannot find the final order in the removal action became a 
final order. 
We acknowledge the record contains no evidence DSS and the family court were 
aware of the prior orders when the removal order was issued.  However, both DSS 
and the family court should have been aware of the potential jurisdictional issues at 
the time of the removal hearing.  According to the removal order, the DSS
caseworker testified Mother and Child had been involved with Georgia 
Department of Families and Children and Pennsylvania Social Services; thus, both 
DSS and the family court should have been aware other orders affecting Child 
could exist. Additionally, DSS knew Mother was a resident of Georgia.  
Notwithstanding all of this, DSS and the family court proceeded without 
attempting to establish whether South Carolina had jurisdiction under the 
UCCJEA. DSS had the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, and it did 
not meet that burden.  In the removal order, the family court merely stated, "This 
court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this action."  We 
find the family court erred in the removal order when it summarily found it had 
jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, we vacate the family court's removal order and TPR order.  Although 
the orders are void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we find South Carolina 
retains temporary emergency jurisdiction under section 63-15-336 pending the 
resolution of this jurisdictional issue, and we remand this to the family court to 
resolve the jurisdictional issue. See Gorup v. Brady, 46 N.E.3d 832, 842 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2015) (vacating orders for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the 
UCCJEA but maintaining temporary emergency jurisdiction pending resolution of 
the jurisdictional issue and remanding with instructions for the trial court to follow 
the temporary emergency jurisdiction procedures).  On remand, the family court 
shall determine whether the Cobb County, Georgia order was a valid order under 
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the UCCJEA.  If so, the family court shall communicate with the court in Cobb 
County to "resolve the emergency."  § 63-15-336(D). If Georgia declines
jurisdiction, the family court shall request Georgia issue an order finding it no 
longer retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction; if Georgia issues such an order, 
DSS may proceed to properly establish jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and initiate 
another removal action.  See § 63-15-332(A)(1).
If the family court determines the Cobb County order was not a valid order under 
the UCCJEA, it shall then determine whether the Pennsylvania order was a valid 
order under the UCCJEA.  If it was, the family court shall communicate with the 
Pennsylvania court to "resolve the emergency."  § 63-15-336(D).  If Pennsylvania 
declines jurisdiction, the family court shall request Pennsylvania issue an order 
finding it no longer retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.  See § 63-15-
332(A)(1).
Based on the foregoing, the family court's removal order and TPR order are 
vacated, and this action is remanded for further findings consistent with this 
opinion. Additionally, consistent with section 63-15-336(C), South Carolina's 
exercise of emergency jurisdiction over this action shall expire sixty days from the 
date this opinion is filed or whenever another state having jurisdiction issues an 
order affecting Child.
VACATED AND REMANDED. 
LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
In The Court of Appeals 
The State, Respondent, 
v. 
Rickey Mazique, Appellant. 
Appellate Case No. 2012-213631 
Appeal From Horry County 
Edward B. Cottingham, Circuit Court Judge 
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Heard January 4, 2016 – Filed October 19, 2016 
AFFIRMED 
J. Falkner Wilkes, of Greenville, for Appellant. 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior 
Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of 
Columbia, and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II, of 
Conway, for Respondent. 
SHORT, J.:  Rickey Mazique appeals from his conviction for armed robbery,
arguing the trial court erred in: (1) not conducting a timely and adequate inquiry as 
to his motion for the appointment of substitute counsel; (2) denying him the right 
to self-representation at a critical stage of the proceedings; (3) allowing the State to
take advantage of him with its prejudicial and inflammatory comments to the jury; 
(4) denying his request to require the State to offer the entire audio of his police 
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interview; (5) refusing to require the State to provide him a copy of the officer's
handwritten notes for cross-examination; (6) denying him the right to effective 
cross-examination of officers; (7) refusing to allow him to cross-examine a witness 
about any pending charges to examine for bias, motive, etc.; and (8) the cumulative 
effect of all the foregoing errors prevented him from having a fair trial.  We affirm. 
FACTS 
A man wearing a wig robbed a Kangaroo convenience store; however, the store 
clerk recognized the robber because he regularly visited the store.  The clerk did 
not know Mazique's name, but she later picked him out of a photographic lineup.  
The surveillance video shows the robber stuffing cigarettes into a trash bag.   
The responding officer's investigation led him to Mazique's residence where 
Mazique's girlfriend consented to a search of the home.  The officers found a trash 
bag full of cartons of cigarettes in a closet and a box of ammunition inside an air 
vent above the kitchen counter. The officers also found a jacket similar to the one 
the robber wore in the surveillance video from the convenience store.  At the police 
station, Mazique gave two tape-recorded statements.  Mazique admitted to robbing 
the convenience store. He also admitted to using a gun, which he threw away, and 
to hiding the ammunition in his kitchen. 
A pre-trial hearing was held on November 8, 2012.  During the hearing, Mazique 
told the court he wanted a new attorney.  After hearing Mazique's complaints about 
his attorney, the court declined to rule on the request until the day of trial and 
ordered his attorney to represent him at trial unless Mazique chose to represent 
himself. The trial was held on November 15-16, 2012.  Mazique was represented 
initially by Melinda A. Knowles at the pre-trial hearing and by Knowles and James 
C. Galmore at the start of his trial.  On the day of the trial and prior to the selection 
of the jury, Mazique requested to represent himself.  The court advised him of the 
dangers of representing himself in an armed robbery case, and Mazique responded 
that his two attorneys were "not an option" and he was "forced" to represent 
himself. Mazique proceeded throughout the trial and sentencing self-represented.  
The jury found him guilty of armed robbery and the court sentenced him to twenty-
five years' incarceration.  This appeal followed.1 
1  J. Falkner Wilkes substituted as counsel prior to the briefing of this appeal and 
represents him in this appeal. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
In criminal cases, this court sits to review errors of law only, and is bound by the 
trial court's factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous.  State v. 
Edwards, 384 S.C. 504, 508, 682 S.E.2d 820, 822 (2009).  Thus, on review, the 
court is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.  Id.  An 
abuse of discretion occurs when the court's decision is unsupported by the evidence 
or controlled by an error of law.  State v. Black, 400 S.C. 10, 16, 732 S.E.2d 880, 
884 (2012). The appellate court "does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own 
view of the preponderance of the evidence but simply determines whether the trial 
court's ruling is supported by any evidence."  Edwards, 384 S.C. at 508, 682 
S.E.2d at 822. 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Appointment of Counsel 
Mazique argues the trial court erred in not conducting a timely and adequate 
inquiry as to his motion for the appointment of substitute counsel.  We disagree. 
The question of whether an appellant's court appointed counsel should be 
discharged is a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial judge, and this court 
will not interfere absent an abuse of such discretion. State v. Graddick, 345 S.C. 
383, 385, 548 S.E.2d 210, 211 (2001).  The "[a]ppellant bears the burden to show 
[a] satisfactory cause for removal."  Id. at 386, 548 S.E.2d at 211. 
In Graddick, our Supreme Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to grant Graddick's request for new counsel four days before the start of 
his trial for murder when he made only the most conclusory arguments as to why 
his counsel should have been relieved, including: "[My attorney] is not 
representing my interests and is not fully prepared for this case.  I do not feel 
comfortable going to court with him as my lawyer."  Id.
During the pre-trial hearing on November 8, Mazique told the court he wanted 
another attorney appointed: "I'm not qualified to go pro se; I just want another 
attorney." The court allowed Mazique to expound on why he was unhappy with 
his attorney. First, he stated his attorney waived his rights to his preliminary 
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hearing without his consent. The court explained to Mazique that the Grand Jury 
true billed his indictment and he was not entitled to a preliminary hearing. 
Second, Mazique stated his attorney knew the solicitor was in possession of 
exculpatory evidence, an alleged altered tape recording of his statement to police, 
and she would not file a pre-trial motion to obtain the evidence.  The State asserted 
it turned over all the recordings to Mazique and there was no alteration of the 
recordings. Mazique then stated he wanted the recording device and the officer's 
hard drive. Mazique's attorney stated she filed the motion to receive the evidence 
Mazique requested and the State replied it did not have access to the recording 
machine. The court then explained to Mazique that he was not entitled to the 
actual recording device, just the original recording, and the recording's authenticity 
would be questioned at trial. 
Third, Mazique stated the arresting officer committed perjury by changing his 
indictment from committing an armed robbery with a box of ammunition to 
committing an armed robbery with a firearm.  The State responded that the arrest 
warrant and the indictment both stated Mazique committed armed robbery.  The 
State explained he was also charged with possession of bullets as a federally 
convicted felon; however, the State was only going forward on the armed robbery. 
The court explained the indictment for armed robbery was true billed and he was 
going to trial on the exact language contained in the indictment. 
Fourth, Mazique asserted he had been asking his attorney to file a motion for the 
production of the cigarettes so he could have his own independent tests done on 
them.  The State responded the police found forty to sixty cartons of cigarettes in 
Mazique's house and after photographing them, the State returned the cigarettes to 
the store. Mazique told the court he had two other pending strong-armed robberies
where he stole cigarettes and he had the right to determine if the cigarettes were 
from this robbery or another one.  The court found it was sufficient that the State 
had video of Mazique in the store with a gun, taking Newport cigarettes and 
putting them in a plastic bag; statements from Mazique; a positive identification 
from the witness at the store; and cartons of cigarettes at his residence. 
Next, Mazique told the court he would not move forward with his attorney because 
he did not trust her and there was no "line of communication." The court told 
Mazique he had three options: go to trial the next week with his current attorney; 
hire his own attorney; or represent himself.  The court stated Mazique was entitled 
49
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        

	
to a lawyer, but not the lawyer of his choice, and his current attorney was an 
excellent lawyer. Mazique responded, "If you compel me to [be] my own 
la[w]yer, I'll be my own lawyer.  I don't want her representing me."  The court told 
Knowles that, "If on the morning of the trial, he tells me under oath before this 
Court Reporter, that he wants to represent himself, I'm gonna let him do that.  
Otherwise, you're gonna represent him."  The court then held a Jackson v. Denno2 
hearing with Knowles representing Mazique against his objections.
On appeal, Mazique argues the trial court "indicated that it would listen to [his]
grounds but then cut [him] off before he finished" and the court "never conducted a 
proper inquiry into the basis for [his] motion to have new counsel appointed."  
Further, he asserts "the trial court's failure to conduct a through [sic] inquiry 
resulted in a lack of record for this Court to affirm the trial court's denial of [his]
motion."  We find the court listened to Mazique's complaints about his attorney 
and found them to not be a satisfactory cause for removal; therefore, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint Mazique new counsel seven 
days before his trial. 
II. Right to Self-Representation 
Mazique argues the trial court erred in denying him the right to self-representation 
at a critical stage of the proceedings.  We disagree. 
"A South Carolina criminal defendant has the constitutional right to represent 
himself under both the federal and state constitutions."  State v. Barnes, 407 S.C. 
27, 35, 753 S.E.2d 545, 550 (2014).  "The request to proceed pro se must be 
clearly asserted by the defendant prior to trial."  State v. Fuller, 337 S.C. 236, 241, 
523 S.E.2d 168, 170 (1999). An accused is allowed to waive his right to counsel if 
he is (1) advised of his right to counsel, and (2) adequately warned of the dangers 
of self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). 
To determine if an accused has sufficient background to 
comprehend the dangers of self-representation, courts 
consider a variety of factors including: (1) the accused's 
age, educational background, and physical and mental 
health; (2) whether the accused was previously involved 
2  378 U.S. 368 (1964). 
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in criminal trials; (3) whether the accused knew the 
nature of the charge(s) and of the possible penalties; (4) 
whether the accused was represented by counsel before 
trial and whether that attorney explained to him the 
dangers of self-representation; (5) whether the accused 
was attempting to delay or manipulate the proceedings; 
(6) whether the court appointed stand-by counsel; (7) 
whether the accused knew he would be required to 
comply with the rules of procedure at trial; (8) whether 
the accused knew of the legal challenges he could raise in 
defense to the charge(s) against him; (9) whether the 
exchange between the accused and the court consisted 
merely of pro forma answers to pro forma questions; and 
(10) whether the accused's waiver resulted from either 
coercion or mistreatment. 
 
In re Christopher H., 359 S.C. 161, 167-68, 596 S.E.2d 500, 504 (Ct. App. 2004).  
"At bottom, the Faretta right to self-representation is not absolute, and 'the 
government's interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times 
outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer.'"  United States v. 
Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Martinez v. Court of Appeal 
of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000)). 
 
"[A]fter [a] trial has begun, a mere disagreement between a defendant and his 
counsel as to a matter of trial tactics is not sufficient cause, in itself, to require the 
trial court to replace or to offer to replace court appointed counsel with another 
attorney at that time."  State v. Jones, 270 S.C. 587, 588, 243 S.E.2d 461, 462 
(1978). "The question of whether court appointed counsel should be discharged is 
a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial judge.  Only in a case of abuse of 
discretion will this [c]ourt interfere."  State v. Samuel, 414 S.C. 206, 211, 777 
S.E.2d 398, 401 (Ct. App. 2015) (quoting State v. Sims, 304 S.C. 409, 414, 405 
S.E.2d 377, 380 (1991)). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision of the 
trial [court] is based upon an error of law or upon factual findings that are without 
evidentiary support."  Id.  "The right of self-representation does not exist to be used 
as a tactic for delay, for disruption, for distortion of the system, or for manipulation 
of the trial process." Id. at 212, 777 S.E.2d at 401. "A trial court must be 
permitted to distinguish between a manipulative effort to present particular 
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arguments and a sincere desire to dispense with the benefits of counsel."  Id.
(quoting Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 560).
At the pre-trial hearing, Mazique told the court he wanted a new attorney and he 
did not want to proceed Pro Se:  "I'm not qualified to go Pro Se; I just want another 
attorney." The court responded, "on many occasions folks who are set for trial on 
serious charges, the way you are, first thing they do to try and dodge it is throw off 
on the lawyer, want a new lawyer."  Mazique told the court:  "If you compel me to 
[be] my own [lawyer], I'll be my own lawyer.  I don't want her representing me."  
He continued, "And for the record, Your Honor, I'm not insisting that I represent 
myself but I'm . . . also bringing it to the Court's attention the ineffectiveness of my
lawyer . . . " The court told Knowles, "to excuse you to continue the trial would be 
to fall right into his trap of trying to get a continuance and I'm not going to give it 
to him" and "I've heard this so many times he just don't want to go to trial."  
Mazique stated: "Well, I'll represent myself, I don't want you representing me.  I'll 
represent myself; she not representing me."  Knowles then stated:  "Your Honor, 
you said a moment ago that you would only remove me if he said on the record to 
you that he did not want me and he wanted to represent himself."  The court 
responded: "No, sir, he didn't – I haven't heard him say that."  Mazique then told 
the court: "I represent myself but I'm forced to do it.  I'm gonna represent myself.  
I don't want this lawyer."  The court responded to Knowles, "[A]fter he thinks 
about it over the weekend and after we've had these motions, I'll entertain it later."  
Mazique stated, "It's apparent that she's not objecting to that then I'll file these right 
now. If I have to represent myself, I will, I'm prepared to." Knowles told the court 
he has a right to represent himself if he wants.  The State added:  
[I]f the court is going to allow [Mazique] to represent 
himself, the State would ask that, respectfully, that you 
go through the protracted list of advising him of all his 
rights and whether he's waiving them and giving them up 
and whether he actually wants to go Pro Se.  He's said 
multiple times he doesn't want to go Pro Se. 
Knowles stated, "He just said outright he wanted to represent himself."  The court 
responded to Knowles:  "I'm gonna leave you in this case during this Jackson v. 
Denno; it's a very legal matter and he needs representation.  At the appropriate 
time, if he wants to represent himself, I'll deal with it.  I'm not gonna deal with it 
until this Jackson v. Denno hearing is over." 
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During the remainder of the Jackson v. Denno hearing, Mazique repeatedly stated 
he would represent himself.  The court told Knowles to continue to represent him 
until trial. Mazique responded, "What about now, Your Honor?  I'm telling you 
now that I want to represent my – this is pretrial."  The court stated: "I'm not going 
to do that now. I want him to have a lawyer under these technical issues."  
Towards the end of the hearing, the court told Mazique: 
If on the morning of the trial – I just want you to have her 
preparation for the next week, in fairness to you.  If on 
the morning of the trial, after examination, you tell me 
that you want to represent yourself, I'm gonna give you 
that opportunity. But in fairness to you, I want her to at 
least prepare for trial and turn over her trial material to 
you. I'm trying to help you if you'll let me. 
Mazique responded: "Your Honor, and I'm asking you, you say you're trying to
help me and I'm telling – I'm explaining to you, I understand the law.  I understand 
that the pretrial proceeding is the most important part of the trial."  The court did 
not respond. After Mazique was removed from the courtroom for talking when he 
was instructed not to, Knowles repeated to the court that Mazique had the right to 
represent himself if he chooses.  The court responded:   
He does, clearly. But he hasn't really said that yet and I 
wanted you to stay here for these legal motions that he's
not competent to handle.  But it's obvious to me and 
should be to everybody in the courtroom what he's trying 
to do and we can't be a party to that. 
At the start of trial, Mazique again asserted he wanted to represent himself.  The 
court gave Mazique warnings about self-representation and asked him about his 
age, educational background, and knowledge of the law.  After allowing Mazique 
to raise multiple motions to the court, the court again addressed Mazique's motion 
to represent himself. The court advised Mazique:  "I would urge you, . . . as strong 
as I can given the dangers of representing yourself, to let these two distinguished 
attorneys with more than twenty years of experience represent you in this case."
The court continued:
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I have this decision to make, you are faced with a serious 
serious charge. You read some books but you are not 
qualified as a lawyer. You don't know the law of 
evidence. You don't know the law of hearsay.  You don't 
know what's admissible and what's not admissible.  
Those are numerous things that you can't possibly know 
as a layman and for you to attempt to represent yourself 
in an armed robbery case is pure folly, however, the only 
thing the law requires me to do is make sure that it's your 
decision knowing the dangers of it and I would urge you 
to let these lawyers represent you in the trial of this case.  
Now having said that if you say, ["]I knowing the 
dangers wish to represent myself[,"] I'm going to let you 
do it but they will not be available to you in the trial; now 
do you understand that? 
Mazique responded: "Yes sir, I understand that."  The court asked Mazique to 
answer the question, "knowing that they will not be available to you in the trial of 
the case, knowing the danger of representing yourself, is it your intention to 
represent yourself or to have these lawyers help with trial?"  Mazique finally 
responded: "No, I don't, I'll represent myself, I'm forced to, I will represent 
myself."  The trial proceeded with Mazique representing himself. 
On appeal, Mazique argues the court erred by not conducting a Faretta hearing 
during the Jackson v. Denno hearing when Mazique told the court he wanted to 
represent himself.  He asserts that once the court conducted the proper inquiry 
during the trial, the court found Mazique capable of representing himself; thus, 
there was no basis to deny his right to self-representation at the pretrial stage.  
Mazique asserts the denial of his requests to represent himself require a reversal of 
his conviction. Although Mazique told the court he no longer wanted his attorney 
to represent him, he was equivocal about whether he wanted to represent himself.  
Because the request to proceed pro se must be clearly asserted by the defendant, 
we find no error in the court's initial denial to dismiss Mazique's counsel during the 
pretrial hearing.  See Fuller, 337 S.C. at 241, 523 S.E.2d at 170. 
Further, Mazique argues that during the jury selection, he was denied the right to 
self-representation when his stand-by counsel responded to the court's question 
asking whether there were any objections to the selection of the jury; whereby 
54
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 

	
waiving his ability to make a Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), motion.  At 
the beginning of trial, the court allowed Mazique to represent himself, and 
Mazique conducted the jury selection process.  Once the jury was selected, the 
court asked the State if it had any motions.  The State replied it did not.  The court 
then asked if the defense had any motions.  Galmore responded, "No, sir."  
Mazique did not say anything. After lunch, Mazique told the court he wanted to 
make a Batson motion. The court then told Mazique he could not make the motion 
because the defense did not object after the jury selection.  If Mazique had an 
objection to the jury selection, he could have said so after Galmore responded to 
the court's question. Therefore, we find no error in the court's denial of his motion.   
III. Comments to Jury 
Mazique argues the trial court erred in allowing the State to take advantage of him 
with its prejudicial and inflammatory comments to the jury.  We disagree. 
"A solicitor's closing argument must not appeal to the personal biases of the jurors 
nor be calculated to arouse the jurors' passions or prejudices, and its content should 
stay within the record and reasonable inferences to it."  Humphries v. State, 351 
S.C. 362, 373, 570 S.E.2d 160, 166 (2002).  "[I]mproper comments do not require
reversal if they are not prejudicial to the defendant."  State v. Rudd, 355 S.C. 543, 
550, 586 S.E.2d 153, 157 (Ct. App. 2003).  "On appeal, an appellate court will 
review the alleged impropriety of the solicitor's argument in the context of the 
entire record, including whether the trial judge's instructions adequately cured the 
improper argument and whether there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant's
guilt." Id.
Mazique did not object to the State's comments at trial.  However, while the 
general rule is the lack of a contemporaneous objection to an improper argument 
acts as a waiver, our supreme court has held that "even in the absence of a 
contemporaneous objection, a new trial motion should be granted in flagrant cases 
where a vicious, inflammatory argument results in clear prejudice."  Toyota of 
Florence, Inc. v. Lynch, 314 S.C. 257, 263, 442 S.E.2d 611, 615 (1994).
On appeal, Mazique argues the State repeatedly made flagrant and inflammatory 
comments to the jury.  First, he asserts the solicitor told the jury he believed 
Mazique was guilty. Second, Mazique argues the solicitor put into issue the 
credibility of his girlfriend's testimony about her consent to search the house and 
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argued facts not in the record by telling the jury how much a carton of Newport 
cigarettes cost. 
We find the solicitor's comments referring to his belief that Mazique was guilty 
were in response to Mazique's closing argument to the jury that the solicitor had an 
obligation to investigate before charging and that the solicitor mislead the jury.  
See Vaughn v. State, 362 S.C. 163, 169, 607 S.E.2d 72, 75 (2004) ("Conduct that 
would otherwise be improper may be excused under the 'invited reply' doctrine if 
the prosecutor's conduct was an appropriate response to statements or arguments 
made by the defense."). The question of whether Mazique's girlfriend consented to 
the search of the home was an issue for the court, not the jury.  Thus, although the 
comment was improper, we find it was not prejudicial to Mazique.  Also, the value 
of the stolen cigarettes was not an element of the crime or vital to the evidence in 
the case; thus, the comment was not prejudicial to Mazique. We further find the 
solicitor's brief comments do not rise to "extraordinary circumstances" that would 
excuse the failure to make a contemporaneous objection.  See Toyota of Florence, 
Inc. v. Lynch, 314 S.C. 257, 263, 442 S.E.2d 611, 615 (1994) (holding that "even 
in the absence of a contemporaneous objection, a new trial motion should be 
granted in flagrant cases where a vicious, inflammatory argument results in clear 
prejudice."). Mazique finally argues this is a novel issue because "this case 
involves an obvious attempt by the solicitor to take advantage of the self-
represented defendant." Therefore, he asserts the State should not be allowed to 
raise his failure to object to its improper statements as a defense.  We do not find 
this is a novel issue, and Mazique chose to represent himself at trial.  See Barnes, 
407 S.C. at 31, 753 S.E.2d at 547 ("Appellant [who moved to be allowed to 
proceed pro se] acknowledged he understood he would be held to the same 
standards as an attorney regarding the rules of court and of evidence."). 
IV. Audio of Police Interview 
Mazique argues the trial court erred in denying his request to require the State to 
offer the entire audio of his police interview. We disagree. 
At trial, the State played for the jury a shortened version of the audio tape from his 
interview with the police. Mazique objected to the introduction of only a portion 
of the interview, requesting the whole interview be played for the jury.  The State
asserted it left out the parts of the recording mentioning other crimes and the 
investigation of other crimes. 
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On appeal, Mazique argues he was entitled to play the audio tape pursuant to Rule 
106, SCRE. Rule 106 provides: 
When a writing, or recorded statement, or part thereof is 
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the 
introduction at that time of any other part or any other 
writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to 
be considered contemporaneously with it. 
He argues the trial court erred in allowing the State to offer only a portion of the 
interview, which "forced [him] to introduce" the entire audio tape that had been 
redacted over his objection in the State's case.  He argues the court improperly 
forced him into choosing between introducing evidence he thought was important 
or losing the right to the last argument.  He maintains the court knew he did not 
plan to testify and there were no other witnesses, but he had to recall Detective 
Chatfield to examine him about the portion of the audio the State did not play for 
the jury and Officer Brian Scales to question him about portions of the store 
surveillance and in-car video. This resulted in him losing the last argument.  He 
asserts this was error because had he been allowed to argue last, he could have 
more adequately addressed the improper issues raised by the State in its closing 
argument. Thus, he asserts the loss of last argument was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.
During the Jackson v. Denno hearing, the trial court redacted all parts of the police 
interviews that were prejudicial to Mazique, and Mazique did not object.  Because 
the audio tapes were redacted for Mazique's benefit, we find the court did not err in 
allowing the State to play only the redacted portions not prejudicial to Mazique.  
We also find no violation of Rule 106, SCRE, because the court allowed Mazique 
to play the full audio recording in his defense.  Further, because Mazique chose to 
recall two witnesses in his defense, he would have lost last argument regardless of 
whether the court had not redacted the audio tapes.  Finally, we find any error was 
harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Mazique's guilt.  See State v. 
Bryant, 369 S.C. 511, 518, 633 S.E.2d 152, 156 (2006) ("Generally, appellate 
courts will not set aside convictions due to insubstantial errors not affecting the 
result."); Arnold v. State, 309 S.C. 157, 172, 420 S.E.2d 834, 842 (1992) (stating 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if it did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained). 
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V. Officer's Notes 
Mazique argues the trial court erred in refusing to require the State to provide him
a copy of the officer's handwritten notes for cross-examination.  We disagree. 
During Mazique's cross-examination of Detective Chatfield, it was revealed that 
Chatfield had written notes about the case.  Mazique told the court he had not 
received any written notes in his discovery.  The State responded that the policy is 
to not turn over written notes of a detective's thoughts or feelings.  The court 
agreed, and Mazique did not object.  Because Mazique did not object or move to 
have the notes produced, we find this issue is not preserved for our review.  See 
State v. Walker, 366 S.C. 643, 660, 623 S.E.2d 122, 130 (Ct. App. 2005) ("An 
issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to 
the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review.").       
VI. Cross-Examination of Officers 
Mazique argues the trial court erred in denying him the right to effective cross-
examination of officers. We disagree. 
Mazique argues on appeal that the court erred in not allowing him to challenge 
Detective Chatfield's testimony and recollection of events by offering into 
evidence a document produced by Chatfield that Mazique believed would show 
additional inconsistencies between Chatfield's report and testimony.  Further, he 
asserts the court did not allow him to play the interview audio to impeach 
Chatfield's testimony during cross-examination and did not allow him to question 
Chatfield about whether the tapes were altered from the original.  Further, he 
asserts his cross-examination of Officer Scales was unduly limited by the court not 
allowing him to play the surveillance video for the jury.  Finally, he argues the 
court's refusal to make the transcript of the pre-trial hearing available to Mazique 
limited his ability to cross-examine Chatfield during the trial.   
Mazique fails to cite to any case law for these assertions; therefore, we find he has 
abandoned them.  See Rule 208(b)(1)(D), SCACR (requiring citation to authority 
in the argument section of an appellant's brief); State v. Lindsey, 394 S.C. 354, 363, 
714 S.E.2d 554, 558 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding "[a]n issue is deemed abandoned 
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and will not be considered on appeal if the argument is raised in a brief but not 
supported by authority"). 
VII. Cross-Examination of Witness 
Mazique argues the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to cross-examine a 
witness about any pending charges to examine for bias, motive, etc. We disagree. 
Rule 608(c), SCRE, provides: "Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may 
be shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by 
evidence otherwise adduced." 
Mazique argues the trial court erred under Rule 608(c), SCRE, by preventing him
from cross-examining the robbery victim about the existence of any pending 
charges against her. He argues Rule 608(c) provides evidence of a witnesses'
pending charges is appropriate when it is offered for impeachment purposes.  He 
maintains "[p]ending charges could create the possibility that [the victim] would 
give biased testimony in an effort to have the solicitor highlight to her future trial 
judge how she had cooperated in the instant case."   
However, at trial, Mazique asked the victim if she had ever been arrested and did 
not ask her whether she had any pending charges.  Because Mazique did not object 
or offer evidence of the victim's pending charges, we find this issue is not 
preserved for our review. See Walker, 366 S.C. at 660, 623 S.E.2d at 130 ("An 
issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to 
the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review."). 
VIII. Prejudicial Effect 
Finally, Mazique argues the cumulative effect of all the foregoing errors prevented 
him from having a fair trial.   
He asserts the record shows a multitude of substantial issues that prevented him
from having a fair trial, and reversal is required under the doctrine of cumulative 
error. Because we find no error by the trial court on any of the issues raised by 
Mazique, we need not address this issue.  See Futch v. McAllister Towing of 
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an 
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appellate court need not review remaining issues when its determination of another 
issue is dispositive of the appeal). 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the trial court is 
AFFIRMED.
GEATHERS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 
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